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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
DONALD P. KOMMERS*
This Article compares the constitutional thought of the United States
Supreme Court and the West German Federal Constitutional Court in
the area of free speech. The primary focus is on cases dealing with
governmental restraints on speech arising out of concern for internal
security' and commentary affecting the reputation of public figures.2
These cases reflect major lines of German and American free speech
thought. The objective of this Article is to compare the concepts of free
speech that have evolved in the opinions of the two tribunals and to
consider the significance of the separate doctrinal paths taken by each
court.
Because comparative constitutional law is a beginning effort in a
largely unplowed field, the Article opens with a discussion of some
goals of comparative research.3 This discussion is followed by a brief
description of judicial review in the two countries,4 particularly in Ger-
many, before turning to the main body of the Article.
I. THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH
There are difficulties inherent in any effort to compare constitutional
law across national boundaries. Probably the most serious problem in
the study of comparative law is whether adequate comparability can be
* Professor of Law and Professor of Government and International Studies, University of
Notre Dame. Director of Center for Civil and Human Rights, Notre Dame Law School. Ph.D.
1962, University of Wisconsin.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Ms. Jane Farrell and Mr. James Gresser
in the preparation of this Article.
1. See text accompanying notes 41-62, 98-125 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 63-75, 126-62 infra.
3. See Part I infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 6-35 infra.
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achieved. One may choose to compare problems or branches of law in
legal systems that are too different to yield significant conclusions. For
example, if the starting point of comparative research is a particular
issue, it is possible that variations in cultural values and political norms
of two or more systems make those systems too dissimilar to regard the
issue under study as a common problem. If the starting point is a
branch of law (e.g, constitutional law), good sense would dictate the
selection of bodies of law that are approximately at the same level of
development and complexity. But even here, variations in political, so-
cial, and economic values may diminish the strength of ensuing gener-
alizations.
The way to avoid the worst of these pitfalls is to study similar bod-
ies of law and social settings. West Germany and the United States
seem to meet this standard. Both states are committed to constitutional
government and individual rights; both are western democracies with
secular political cultures; both are advanced technological and pluralis-
tic societies; and both are troubled by similar problems of political or-
der. At the same time, both societies and many of their values are
changing. Some of these changes are convergent, some divergent, but
all are unpredictable. The political and social options of these two
countries are open, as one can expect in free societies, just as their high
courts are open to new interpretations of old constitutional norms.
These general conditions render the comparison of constitutional cases
across national boundaries an intelligible and intellectually exciting en-
terprise.
A comparative approach to the study of constitutional law is use-
ful for at least three reasons. First, curious scholars may want to ex-
plain similarities and differences in constitutional doctrine across
national boundaries. Variations in modes of constitutional analysis, ju-
dicial decisionmaking procedures, and judicial structure (as well as dif-
fering social, religious, and cultural traditions) are likely to be relevant
considerations. Second, at a more philosophical level, the comparative
study of constitutional law can be a quest for higher principles of con-
stitutional order and a more adequate public philosophy. Comparative
study liberates persons from the ethnocentrism associated with the ex-
clusive study of a single legal system and opens them to the wisdom
contained in other traditions of constitutional democracy. As the au-
thor noted in a previous article:
In a very real sense, they [constitutional courts] represent political
man writ large and thinking about where to draw the troublesome
line between liberty and order ... Thus, the study of comparative
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constitutional law can be a search for principles of justice and politi-
cal obligation that transcend the culture-bound opinions and conven-
tions of a particular political community. As such, it can lead men to
the attainment of truth and a better understanding of man's political
condition.
5
Finally, the comparative study of constitutional law has implica-
tions for constitutional interpretation in the United States. Serious at-
tention to foreign constitutional cases may contribute beneficially to the
growth of American constitutional law by, for example, providing al-
ternative standards for measuring the work of the Supreme Court.
Such cases may also come to be regarded as important sources of con-
stitutional interpretation along with judicial precedents, historical tra-
ditions, and the enlightened opinion of the community.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW: STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES
Because variations in judicial structures and procedures may account
for differences in judicial decision making by constitutional courts, a
brief description of the major institutional differences between the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court seems useful.
One major difference between these two courts is that the Federal
Constitutional Court is a specialized tribunal with exclusive jurisdic-
tion to decide constitutional questions under the Basic Law.6  The
Supreme Court, on the other hand, like final courts of appeal in other
common law countries, is a court of general public law jurisdiction au-
thorized to pass on all questions properly before it arising under federal
law, including federal constitutional questions.7 The organization of a
specialized tribunal to hear constitutional cases is consistent with the
general pattern of German court organization.'
A second important structural feature of the Federal Constitu-
5. Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.
685, 692 (1976).
6. The West German Constitution is known as the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The term
"basic law" was intended originally to underscore the temporary nature of the constitution pend-
ing the reunification of Germany, an expectation that was very much alive in 1949 when the Basic
Law was adopted.
7. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, par. 1.
8. For example, there are in West Germany, apart from the courts of ordinary civil and
criminal jurisdiction, separate systems of labor, finance, social, administrative, and constitutional
courts. It also should be noted that whereas the United States has a dual system of state and
federal courts, Germany has a unified judicial system in which all trial and intermediate courts of
appeal are organized at the state level, while all final courts of appeal are federal tribunals. For a
further discussion of German judicial structure, see W. HEYDE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 41-98 (1971). For an excellent discussion of the struc-
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tional Court is its division into two chambers, called senates, which
have exclusive memberships and exclusive jurisdiction over certain
constitutional cases. Each senate is composed of eight judges selected
by Parliament for twelve year terms. Reelection is not permitted. The
President of the Federal Constitutional Court presides over the First
Senate, the Vice President over the Second Senate. The Plenum-the
justices of both senates sitting en banc-meets only to deal with matters
pertaining to the internal administration of the Federal Constitutional
Court as a whole, to settle disputes arising out of the wish of one senate
to depart from a formal ruling by the other, or to transfer jurisdiction
from one senate to another. Generally, the First Senate is authorized to
review judicial decisions and constitutional complaints arising out of
individual claims to civil and political liberties guaranteed by the Basic
Law. Free speech cases would accordingly fall within the competence
of the First Senate. The Second Senate's jurisdiction generally includes
cases involving the procedural rights of criminal defendants, election
disputes, federal-state conflicts, controversies between "branches" of
the federal government (ie., the two houses of Parliament (Federal
Diet and Federal Council), Chancellor and Cabinet, and the President
of the Federal Republic), and the constitutionality of political parties.9
Thus, for all practical purposes, the Federal Constitutional Court is
comprised of two independent constitutional tribunals.'0
Nearly all of the court's jursidiction, covering fourteen categories
of disputes,"' is prescribed by the Basic Law. For the purposes of this
Article, the most important of these categories are: (1) controversies
ture of judicial review in common law and civil law systems, see M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73-112 (1979).
9. Given this distribution ofjurisdiction, one would expect disputes regarding the constitu-
tionality of political parties to be decided by the First Senate. This was indeed the case until 1957
when the Federal Diet, because of its dissatisfaction with the First Senate's handling of the Com-
munist Party case, transferred jurisdiction over party cases to the Second Senate. See D. KoM-
MERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY 190-91 (1976).
10. The organization, procedures, and processes for the filing and disposition of cases are
regulated by statute. See Gesetz ueber das Bundesverfassungsgericht, Law of February 3, 1971,
[1971] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 105 (W. Ger.). The original act, which has been amended
several times, was enacted in 1951. See Law of Mar. 12, 1951, [1951] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I
243 (W. Ger.). The court's internal administration (le., formation of budget, administrative du-
ties ofjudges, authority and procedures of the Plenum, selection and responsibilities of law clerks,
judicial conference procedures, rules governing oral argument and preparation of written opin-
ions) is regulated by the court's standing orders. See Geschaeftsordnung des Bundesverfassung-
sgerichts, Law of Sept. 2, 1975, [1975] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 1 2515 (W. Ger.). The
organization and internal administration of the court is treated at considerable length in D. KOM-
MERS, su.pra note 9, at 69-108.
11. See GRUNDGESETZ art. 13 (W. Ger. 1949, amended 1968) [hereinafter cited as GG].
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arising under the court's abstract judicial review procedure (abstrakte
Normenkontrolle); 2 (2) controversies arising under its concrete judicial
review procedure (konkrete Normenkontrolle);13 (3) governmental mo-
tions challenging the constitutionality of political parties;14 and (4) the
constitutional complaints of individual persons. 5 With the single ex-
ception of constitutional complaints, access to the court is limited to
state and federal governments, courts, and parliamentary groups such
as party factions and minorities in national and state legislatures.
In each of the above categories a procedure is followed that is sub-
stantially different from the process of judicial review in the Supreme
Court. This difference is particularly noticeable in the first category-
abstract judicial review proceedings. Whereas the United States
Supreme Court requires that all constitutional issues be raised within
the framework of ordinary litigation involving a real controversy and
adverse parties,' 6 the Federal Constitutional Court is empowered to de-
cide "differences of opinion or doubts on the formal and material com-
patibility of federal or land law with the Basic Law or the
compatibilility of land law with other federal law."17 Such a proceed-
ing may be triggered at the request of the federal government, a state,
or one-third of the members of the Federal Diet (Bundestag).' 8 The
relevant "parties" in such cases-the state and federal governments or
counsel representing the majority and minority points of view in the
Bundestag-are required to submit written briefs. Oral argument
before the court may also be authorized in such cases.' 9 In any event,
the question of the law's validity is squarely before the court in such
cases, and a decision against its validity renders the law null and void.20
12. Id art. 2.
13. Id art. 6.
14. Id art. 8a.
15. Id art. 11. The remaining ten categories are proceedings involving the forfeiture of
basic rights (id art. 18), conflicts between high federal organs (Id art. 93, § 1), federal-state con-
flicts (id. art. 92, § 13A, art. 84, § 4), public law disputes (id. art. 93, § 4), constitutional disputes
within states (id art. 99), international law disputes (id art. 100, § 2), cases certified by state
constitutional courts (id art. 61), complaints against federal judges (id art. 98, §§ 2, 5), and elec-
tion disputes (id art. 41, § 2). In addition, the Basic Law provides that "[t]he Federal Constitu-
tional Court shall also act in such other cases as are assigned to it by federal legislation." For
many years the court heard constitutional complaints, often reluctantly, pursuant to federal stat-
utes, but in 1969 the Basic Law was amended to allow the filing of such complaints as a matter of
constitutional right. See id art. 93, § 4a (amended 1969).
16. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
17. GG, supra note 11, art. 93, § 2.
18. Id art. 82.
19. Id arts. 22, 25.
20. Id art. 31(2).
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On the other hand, cases before the Federal Constitutional Court
dealing with concrete judicial review arise out of real lawsuits. But the
moving party in such cases is the trial or appellate tribunal, not the
parties to the lawsuit. If the judge or judges (in collegial courts) con-
clude that a federal or state law under which a case has arisen is uncon-
stitutional, they may not themselves decide the constitutional question;
rather, they must, by majority vote, certify the question to the Federal
Constitutional Court for decision pending the resolution of the case.
Certification of such questions to the court does not depend upon the
constitutional issue having been raised by one of the parties. The peti-
tion to the court is made solely at the discretion of the judges. 2'
The third category of disputes involves the legality of political par-
ties. The Federal Constitutional Court is empowered under article 21
of the Basic Law to declare unconstitutional political parties which
seek to impair or abolish the "free democratic basic order." Only the
Bundestag, the Bundesrat, or the federal government (i e., the Chancel-
lor and Cabinet) may initiate an article 21 action in the court. Like
most other proceedings before the court, this jurisdiction is compulsory.
Unless the moving party withdraws its petition, the court must eventu-
ally decide the case. The Communist Party22 case of 1956, which artic-
ulates the basic principles of free speech as it relates to internal security
in the Federal Republic, is one of two cases in which the court has
declared political parties unconstitutional.23
Constitutional complaints, the last category of disputes, are the
one exception to the practice of limiting access to the court to govern-
mental agencies and constitutional institutions. Any person who claims
that one of his basic rights or one of his rights under articles 20(4), 33,
38, 101, 103, or 104 has been violated by public authority may file a
constitutional complaint with the court.24 Ordinarily a person is re-
quired to exhaust all of his legal remedies before "appealing" to the
21. See G. LEIBHOLZ & R. RUPPRECHT, BUNDESVPRFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ: RECHT-
SPRECHUNGSKOMMENTAR 295 (1968).
22. Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956, Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), [1956, 5
BVerfGE 85 (W. Ger.).
23. The neo-Nazi Socialist Reichs Party had been banned earlier in Judgment of Oct. 23,
1952, [1952], 2 BVerfGE 1 (V. Ger.).
24. GG, supra note 11, art. 90. The substantive rights of persons are listed in articles I
through 17 of the Basic Law. These include the freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, move-
ment, association, and equality under law. The other rights refer mainly to the rights of citizen-
ship and to the rights of defendants in criminal cases. Local governments are also permitted to
bring constitutional complaints on the ground that their right to self-government under article 28
of the Basic Law has been infringed. See id art. 93, § 4b.
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court. Constitutional complaints, most of which are lodged against ju-
dicial rulings, make up about ninety-six percent of all docketed cases
and fifty-five percent of the court's published opinions.25
Finally, four general differences in the decisionmaking processes
of the two tribunals should be mentioned. First, whereas the exercise
of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is largely discretionary,26 the exer-
cise of the Federal Constitutional Court's jurisdiction is obligatory. Al-
though the Federal Constitutional Court has adopted several policies
limiting the conditions under which certain categories of cases will be
decided, 7 the general rule is that constitutional disputes properly
before the court must be decided. No "political question" doctrine in-
trudes to absolve the Federal Constitutional Court from the responsi-
bility of decision. Justices may grimace with personal disapproval and
squirm with alarm, as some of them did in the Communist Party case,2 8
when governments petiti9n the court to decide politically sensitive
cases. But it is the accepted view that motions in such cases are politi-
cal judgments on the part of government. Once such political judg-
ments are made, the court's only recourse is to decide the cases on the
basis of legal principles. Nor can the court avoid decision in constitu-
tional cases by retreating into a set of "Ashwander" type rules used by
the Supreme Court to cabin its authority.29 The Federal Constitutional
25. The disposition of constitutional complaints is described in detail in D. KOMMERS, supra
note 9, at 167-75.
26. See Sup. CT. R. 19.
27. For example, in concrete judicial review cases the Federal Constitutional Court requires
a showing by lower court judges that their reservations or doubts about the constitutionality of a
statute are serious, compelling, or genuine. See G. LEIBHOLZ & R. RUPPRECHT, supra note 21, at
295. Until 1963, the court rejected constitutional complaints found to be "patently unfounded."
But rejections on this ground had to be the result of a unanimous decision on the part of a three-
judge committee authorized by a full senate to consider the admissibility of constitutional com-
plaints. When the number of these complaints doubled, the procedure was revised to lighten the
judicial burden. A new statutory rule broadened, but only slightly, the discretionary authority of
three-judge committees to reject complaints. The Constitutional Court Organization Act now pro-
vides that a complaint may be refused "if it is inadmissible or for other reasons cannot be satisfac-
torily resolved." But a majority of the full senate may no longer reject a complaint that has
survived committee consideration. A "rule of two," analogous to the Supreme Court's "rule of
four" in the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, see Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955), now obtains: If at least two justices "are of the opinion that a decision
in the matter would clarify a constitutional question or a failure to decide would result in a heavy
hardship for the complainant," the constitutional complaint will be accepted and decided on the
merits by the full senate. See GG, supra note 11, art. 93a(4).
28. Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956, Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), [1956], 5
BVerfGE 85 (W. Ger.); see text accompanying notes 122-23 infra.
29. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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Court's primary role in the German legal system is to resolve constitu-
tional disputes when they arise.
Second, in contrast to the Supreme Court," the Federal Constitu-
tional Court is required to justify its rulings in written opinions. 30 Per
curiam opinions or summary orders merely affirming or rejecting the
decision below are not a common practice for the court. But, like the
Supreme Court, the Federal Constitutional Court may issue extraordi-
nary writs or temporary orders pending judgment.3 1 The court's opin-
ions are characteristically very formal in style and follow a rather
precise order of presentation, beginning with a brief statement of the
decision and a summary of the reasons supporting it, proceeding to a
rather detailed restatement of the arguments presented in the briefs,
and concluding with a fully reasoned opinion supported by citations to
previous cases and other sources of constitutional interpretation.
A third difference between the modes of decisionmaking by these
two courts is that Federal Constitutional Court cases are considered on
the briefs of the parties. Unlike the Supreme Court, which requires
oral argument in the cases it accepts, the Federal Constitutional Court
rarely invites parties to appear before it in oral proceedings. Justices of
the court tend to regard oral argument as superfluous,32 perhaps reflect-
ing the heavy doctrinal approach fostered by the submission of consti-
tutional disputes in pure form.
Finally, the overwhelming majority of cases handed down by the
Federal Constitutional Court are institutional opinions. Institutional
opinions are usually signed by all justices participating in a case, in-
cluding those who may have been in the minority. Personalized dis-
senting opinions were finally authorized by statute in 1970, 33 but there
remains a strong institutional bias on the court against written dissents.
Between February 25, 1975, and May 24, 1977, dissenting opinions
were written in only 9 out of 154 cases decided with full opinion.34 But
some of the court's most notable and important dissenting opinions
have been drafted in free speech cases.
30. GG, supra note 11, art. 30(1).
31. Id art. 32.
32. See D. KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 180.
33. See GG, supra note 11, art. 30(2); GOrdBVerfGE § 55.
34. See BVerfGE, vols. 39-46.
35. See, e.g., Judgment of Mar. 2, 1977, [1977], Federal Constitutional Court (Second Sen-
ate), 44 BVerfGE 197, 205, 209 (W. Ger.), Judgment of May 11, 1976, [1976], Federal Constitu-
tional Court (First Senate), 42 BVerfGE 143, 154, 162 (W. Ger.); Judgment of Apr, 25, 1972,
[1972], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 33 BVerfGE 52, 78 (W. Ger.); Judgment of
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III. SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
This section focuses on the manner in which the highest courts of judi-
cial review in two major political democracies grapple with the prob-
lem of accommodating freedom of speech to their respective
constitutional systems. Both systems rank free speech among the high-
est values of their respective constitutional orders. The tribunals of
both countries are sensitive to free speech claims and have ardently
defended such claims in their judicial opinions. Yet there are differ-
ences in the balance struck by the two courts between these claims and
other social interests. These differences are rooted, as will become evi-
dent, in the specific language of the German and American constitu-
tions and in different judicial images of social reality projected by the
constitutional cases under study.
A. THE UNITED STATES
The law of free speech in the United States has evolved out of the first
amendment's simple directive that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."36 Decades of judicial
interpretation have underscored the critical importance of this freedom
under the American governmental system. Freedom of speech and of
the press, remarked the Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York,37 "are
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the
[Constitution]." 3 A few years later, Justice Cardozo characterized
freedom of speech as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom." 39 The one sentence from the
Supreme Court's massive writings on speech that most aptly describes
the predominant judicial attitude toward freedom of expression is the
remark of Justice Jackson: "If there is any fixed star in our constitu-
tional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
July 27, 1971, Federal Constitutional Court (Second Senate), 31 BVerfGE 314, 334, 337 (W. Ger.);
Judgment of Feb. 24, 1971, [1971], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 36 BVerfGE 173,
200, 218 (W. Ger.).
In the well-known Spiegel Seizure case, Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, [1966], Federal Constitu-
tional Court (First Senate), 20 BVerfGE 162 (WT. Ger.), decided before public dissenting opinions
were authorized, there was considerable press speculation about the lineup inside the court. As it
turned out, the opinion clearly reflected the inability of the First Senate to break a four-to-four
deadlock. The Spiegel Seizure case was in part responsible for the pressure to authorize dissenting
opinions. For an account of the Spiegel case entanglements, see Kommers, The Spiegel 4ffair: 4
Case Study in Judicial Politics, in POLTICAL TRIALs 5-33 (T.L. Becker ed. 1971).
36. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
37. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
38. Id at 666.
39. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."
40
1. Speech and Security" The Polity as a Neutral Forum
The first amendment creates in the mind of the Supreme Court an open
system of free expression in which government is barred from prescrib-
ing any orthodoxy or system of values. The prevailing judicial image
of the American constitutional system draws its main strength from the
well-known Holmesian metaphor of the market. Justice Holmes wrote:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foun-
dations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out.
41
Justice Holmes did not indicate precisely how ideas would be delivered
to the market, or whether all ideas relevant to an issue under public
discussion would get into the market.42 Presumably, a regime based on
free expression would automatically take care of such problems. Fur-
thermore, a critic of the market analogy might suggest that unregulated
markets tend to create monopolies, a result that Justice Holmes himself
recognized when he remarked in Gitlow that "[i]f in the long run the
beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted
by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.
' 43
Again the critic might suggest that this is no way ultimately to protect
the integrity of a democratic system. Justice Holmes might well have
responded that a laissez-faire system is the only way ultimately to safe-
guard both political democracy and individual freedom.
The free trade image of speech described by Justice Holmes was
strongly reflected in the "clear and present danger" test for determining
the legitimacy of governmental restraints on speech. This test was orig-
iially formulated by Justice Holmes in Schenk v. United States.44 "The
40. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
41. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissent-
ing).
42. Id at 624-31 (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
43. 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
44. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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question in every case," Justice Holmes said, "is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."45 Justice Brandeis,
in a related case, joined Justice Holmes in concluding that under this
test only the "danger of immediate evil" could justify the suppression
of speech.4 6 In a concurring opinion upholding a conviction under
California's Criminal Syndicalism Act,47 Justice Brandeis, joined by
Justice Holmes, wrote:
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards.
They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the
cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in
the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the
processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can
be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil appre-
hended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity
for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of educa-
tion, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if
authority is to be reconciled with freedom.48
To Justice Brandeis, the function of free speech is "to free men from
the bondage of irrational fears," and thus, the only fear that can justify
the suppression of speech is the "fear that serious evil will [immedi-
ately] result if free speech is practiced."49
The "clear and present danger" test was wholly compatible with
the emerging doctrine of "preferred freedoms." This doctrine held that
45. Id at 52. Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes sustained the conviction of a Socialist
charged under the Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (current version
at 18 US.C. § 2388 (1976)), with obstructing the military draft. The conviction was upheld on the
basis of clear evidence showing that the defendant had printed and mailed several thousand leaf-
lets condemning the draft and encouraging drafted men to resist military induction. Id at 48-53.
46. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissent-
ing).
47. 1919 Cal. Stats. ch. 188, at 281 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11402
(West 1970 & Cum. Supp. 1980)).
48. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (citation omitted) (Brandeis and Holmes,
JJ., concurring).
49. Id at 376. It should be noted that the "clear and present danger" approach to constitu-
tional adjudication remained a minority view until 1937, when it was first used as a test for deter-
mining the validity of legislation restricting speech. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
Until 1937, the Supreme Court had followed the "bad tendency" test of Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925). Under the teaching of Gitlow, the state could permissibly punish speech and
advocacy whose "natural tendency and probable effect [is] to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body might prevent.' Id at 671 (citations omitted).
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certain freedoms-such as the rights to free speech, free press, free as-
sociation, and to vote-are so fundamental to the realization of an
open political process that they require special protection under the
United States Constitution.50 Accordingly, there is a strong presump-
tion against the constitutionality of any legislation that seeks to limit
these freedoms. Although the contemporary Court makes little explicit
reference to "preferred freedoms," the doctrine is still very much an
implicit part of American free speech analysis.
Like the "preferred status" doctrine, the "clear and present dan-
ger" test has followed a somewhat meandering course over the years. It
was radically revised, to the severe detriment of free speech claimants,
during the 1950's when the nation was obsessed with communist "sub-
version," 51 and again substantially modified, to the advantage of
speech claimants, in the following two decades.
Brandenburg v. Ohio52 fairly illustrates the contemporary ap-
proach of the Supreme Court. Brandenburg, a member of the Ku Klux
Klan, was convicted under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act5 3 for ut-
tering derogatory remarks about Negroes and Jews at a rally and cross-
burning ceremony and for advocating a Klan assault on the President
and Congress if the latter continued "to suppress the white, Caucasian
race."' In a per curiam opinion, the Court invalidated the law because
50. The seed of the "preferred freedoms" doctrine was planted by Justice Cardozo in Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937), when he spoke of the fundamentality of freedom of
thought and speech. One year later, Chief Justice Stone, in a famous footnote to United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), suggested the use of the strict scrutiny test in
reviewing legislation imposing restraints on fundamental freedoms. The doctrine was finally ac-
cepted by a majority of the Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and continued
to prevail as an articulate principle of constitutional analysis, over the vigorous objection of Jus-
tice Frankfurter, throughout the 1940's. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-97 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
51. During the 1950's, the Court came close to resurrecting the "bad tendency" test. The
gloss put on "clear and present danger" restricted speech far beyond the Holmes-Brandeis under-
standing of the doctrine. Borrowing from the formula used by Judge Learned Hand, Chief Justice
Vinson held in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), that Congress could validly prohibit
subversive speech if "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such inva-
sion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id at 510 (citing United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (opinion of Hand, J.)). "It is the existence of the conspiracy
which creates the danger," continued Vinson, "[i]f the ingredients of the reaction are present, we
cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added." Id at 511 (citations omitted). In
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), however, the Court retreated from the broad implica-
tions of Dennis. There, the Court distinguished between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advo-
cacy of action, holding that only the latter can be proscribed. Id at 318-19.
52. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
53. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (Page) (repealed 1974).
54. 395 U.S. at 446.
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it failed to distinguish between mere advocacy and "incitement to im-
minent lawless action."5 5 This "imminent lawless action" standard is
the "clear and present danger" test under another guise. But Justices
Douglas and Black, pointing to the flexible character of the test, urged
its rejection as a standard of review. Their position was that the first
amendment recognizes no line between advocacy of ideas and advo-
cacy of action. 6
Brandenburg has apparently survived the Court's recent personnel
changes. In Hess v. Indiana,57 for example, the Court held per curiam,
over the dissent of Justices Rehnquist, Burger, and Blackmun, that a
virulent outdoor anti-Vietnam War speech sprinkled with obscene lan-
guage and a general call to "take to the streets" could not validly be
punished under Indiana's disorderly conduct statute even though the
trial court had found that the speaker's statements were intended to
incite further lawless action on the part of the crowd and were likely to
produce such action. 8 Because "imminent disorder" did not appear
likely, the judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court affirming the con-
victions was reversed. 9 Similarly, in Bachellar v. Maryland,60 the
'Court reversed a state conviction for "disorderly conduct" involving
anti-Vietnam War demonstrators who protested the war with placards
and leaflets in front of a United States Army recruiting station. Fi-
nally, in 1970, at the height of the war effort, the Court upheld the right
of an actor in a theatrical production to wear a military uniform even
though his performance tended to discredit the armed forces.6' Punish-
ment for this, said the Court, would be an unconstitutional abridge-
ment of an actor's right to free speech.62
55. Id at 449. Under the Ohio statute it was unlawful to advocate "the duty, necessity, or
propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accom-
plishing industrial or political reform. . . or [to] voluntarily assemble with any society, group or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (Page) (repealed 1974). Similar statutes have been upheld by the
Federal Constitutional Court.
56. See 395 U.S. at 449-50 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 450-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
57. 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
58. Id at 106-07.
59. Id at 109. The dissenting Justices would have accepted the finding of the trial court
concerning the imminence of the danger. Id. at 109-12 (Rehnquist, Burger, and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
60. 397 U.S. 564 (1970).
61. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
62. Id at 63.
A genre of speech called "symbolic expression" also emerged from the Vietnam protests. A
conviction for draft card burning was challenged on the ground that the act was protected, "sym-
bolic speech" within the first amendment, or a "communication of ideas by conduct." Rejecting
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As the above decisions clearly indicate, wide berth is accorded to
political utterance in the United States, at least where domestic peace
and internal security are concerlied. The judicial image of the constitu-
tional order tolerates no invasion by government of the realm of ideas.
All political speech is permitted unless it immediately threatens public
safety. Government may not prescribe a philosophy of the public
good: it must maintain a safe distance from the minds of men, must
not seek to regulate the marketplace of ideas, and may not legally take
sides in ideological conflicts. The polity is a neutral forum for the ex-
pression of all points of view.
2. Speech and Reputation." A Polity of Robust Speech
Cases dealing with defamation law have in recent years constituted a
seminal area of free speech jurisprudence in the United States. These
cases pose the question of where to strike the balance between the indi-
vidual's interest in his own reputation and the first amendment's inter-
est in maintaining a regime of free speech. Here, the market analogy
has also pointed the way to the evolution of constitutional doctrine,
although, in the last three years, the Court seems to have forged a
slightly different accommodation between the competing values of
speech and reputation.
The leading case on defamation law is New York Times Co. . Sul-
lipan.63 In New York Times, the Court broke new ground by imposing
severe limitations on a state's power to award damages in a civil libel
action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.
The New York Times of March 30, 1960 printed a full page advertise-
ment condemning "an unprecedented wave of terror" mounted by
Montgomery, Alabama police officials against civil rights demonstra-
tors seeking to exercise their constitutional rights. The advertisement,
this contention, the Court held that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Here, the government's interest in raising and supporting ar-
mies was sufficient to overcome the free speech objection. Compare, however, Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), where the Court invalidated the dismissal of public high
school students who wore black armbands to school in violation of school policy to show their
opposition to the war. Several years later, the court overturned a conviction of a person who had
misused the flag as a protest to the invasion of Cambodia. Because the person involved had
merely improperly displayed a privately owned flag on private property, causing no breach of the
peace, his action was protected by the first amendment. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974). For an earlier case involving mutilation of the flag, see Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969).
63. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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signed by sixty-four widely known persons, carried what were later
shown to be false accusations of grave misconduct against the police.
Montgomery's Commissioner of Public Affairs, who was in charge of
the Police Department, successfully sued the New York Times for dam-
ages under Alabama's civil libel statute. Reversing the decision of the
Alabama Supreme Court affirming a damage award of $500,000, the
Supreme Court announced that the law as applied would have to be
rejected under first amendment standards.
The Court predicated its decision on the fundamental proposition
that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 6 In
such a regime, suggested the Court, erroneous statements are inevitable
and "[w]hatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of
free debate."6 The Court.rejected the common law defense of truth in
civil libel actions as insufficient to protect free speech. The Court set
forth the new rule in the following language:
The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
66
Any other rule, the Court seemed to suggest, would cast a pall of fear
and timidity over those who would give voice to public criticism.
Within a few years, the Court expanded the protection of these
cases from defamation of "public officials" to defamation of "public
figures." Finally, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,67 the Supreme
Court abandoned the effort to tailor the New York Times standard to
the status of the person defamed, thus obliterating the distinction be-
tween private and public persons in such cases. The plurality opinion,
64. Id at 270.
65. Id. at 272 (citing Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 678 (1942)).
66. Id at 279-80. The "reckless falsehood" standard was defined with greater precision in
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968):
[Our cases make] clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably
prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.
There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts
shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
Id at 731.
67. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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written by Justice Brennan, extended the protection of New York Times
to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the statements
concerned matters of general or public interest. Focusing on society's
interest in learning about certain issues, Justice Brennan noted: "If a
matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly be-
come less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because
in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become
involved. 68
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,69 however, the Court rejected Bren-
nan's "public issue-general interest" extension of New York Times.
Speaking through Justice Powell, the Court announced that the protec-
tion of New York Times is not to be extended to defamation suits by
private individuals even though the defamatory statements concern an
issue of public or general interest.7 0 In seeking to reconcile the law of
defamation with the first amendment, the Court ruled that it would be
impermissible for the state to impose liability without fault in such
cases but that the state could define for itself the appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood that
caused injury to a private individual.7 '
Still another way of protecting public figures and citizens from de-
famatory statements would be to grant them a legal right of reply-a
technique used in Germany. But in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,72 the Supreme Court struck down Florida's right of reply stat-
ute, asserting through Chief Justice Burger that "[g]overnment-en-
forced right of access inescapably 'dampens the vigor and limits the
variety of public debate'." 73 To the objection that the public is not be-
ing properly informed because the market place of ideas today a mo-
nopoly controlled by the owners of the communication market, Chief
68. 403 U.S. at 43.
69. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
70. Id at 343.
71. Id at 347. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court started to build a
fence around the notion of "public figure" by declining to apply the New York Times standard to
T'me's defamatory remark about a well-known socialite involved in a divorce proceeding. The
Court refused to apply the standard even though the publisher was reporting on a judicial pro-
ceeding. Involvement in formal judicial proceedings, said the Court, does not automatically trans-
form a private dispute into a public event. Id at 455. Finally, in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979), the Court, while preserving the essential teaching of New York Times, held that journalists
do not have an absolute privilege to refuse to testify in a defamation suit that might lead to the
discovery of evidence showing that damaging falsehoods had been published with malicious in-
tent and total disregard for the truth.
72. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
73. Id at 257 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
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Justice Burger replied that any governmental coercion in this area
would bring about "a confrontation with the express provisions of the
First Amendment and the judicial gloss on that Amendment developed
over the years."74 The Chief Justice concluded: "[P]ress responsibility
is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it can-
not be legislated."75
B. WEST GERMANY
Any analysis of German free speech jurisprudence should begin with
the text of the Basic Law itself. The brevity of the first amendment of
the United States Constitution directive that "Congress shall make no
law" is in sharp contrast to the multiplicity of constitutional provisions
relating to freedom of expression in the Federal Republic. Article 5,
section 1 of the Basic Law guarantees freedom of expression in these
words: "Everyone shall-have the right freely to express and dissemi-
nate his opinion by speech, writing, and pictures and freely to inform
himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and
freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films are guaranteed.
There shall be no censorship."76
This firm declaration against censorship in section 1 is so detailed
in its language as to raise questions about the legitimacy of speech or
forms of expression not falling within the definitions of "opinion," "in-
form," and "reporting." Thus, although the fundamentality of free
speech is avowed with no less intensity in Germany than in the United
States, these provisions in their own right burden speech with a number
of limitations.
More clearly marking the boundaries of speech is section 2 of arti-
cle 5 which declares that "[t]hese rights [of expression and reporting]
are limited by the provisions of the general laws, the provisions of law
for the protection of youth, and the right to inviolability of personal
honor."77 Standing alone, these provisions might seem to strike a bal-
ance between competing values not very different from the balance
struck by judicial interpretation in the United States. But the meaning
of free speech is not exhausted by the provisions of article 5. For a
fuller appreciation of the extent and limits of speech in the Federal
Republic it is necessary to consider article 5 in tandem with other fun-
74. Id at 254.
75. Id at 256.
76. GG, supra note 11, art. 5, § 1.
77. Id §2.
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damental rights and within the context of the constitutional order cre-
ated by the Basic Law.
1. The Basic Law. An Ordering of Values
The Federal Constitutional Court teaches that the Basic Law incorpo-
rates a given order of political and human values. According to this
teaching, the Basic Law is not a value-free constitution. With respect to
the polity, it creates a "militant democracy." With respect to human
rights, which will occupy our attention here, it creates a value system
based on the dignity of man.78 The Basic Law's charter of fundamental
rights begins with a ringing affirmation of human personhood. Article
1, the basis of all personal rights guaranteed by the constitution, de-
clares: "The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect
it shall be the duty of all state authority."7 9 This is no idle declaration.
The Federal Constitutional Court has proclaimed the "dignity of man"
as "the Basic Law's highest legal value" and has employed that con-
cept, much as the United States Supreme Court has used the due proc-
ess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, as an independent
standard of value by which to measure the legitimacy of state actions.80
As the Federal Constitutional Court wrote recently: "The Basic Law
has erected a value-oriented order which places the individual human
being and his dignity at the center of all its determinations. . .[and it
is this] value judgment of the Constitution that informs the organiza-
tion and interpretation of the entire legal order."'"
At this point an American legal scholar might observe that the lan-
guage of human dignity as used by the Federal Constitutional Court is
really no different from the human rights language used in American
constitutional law. He might suggest that German judges are talking
about the same thing in different words. He might question whether
78. See Judgment of Jan. 15, 1958 [1958], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 7
BVerfGE 198, 205 (W. Ger.); Judgment of Dec. 5, 1956 [19561, Federal Constitutional Court (Sec-
ond Senate), 6 BVerfGE 20, 40 (W. Ger.); Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956 [1956], Federal Constitu-
tional Court (First Senate), 5 BVerfGE 134 (W. Ger.); Judgment of Oct. 23, 1952 [1952], Federal
Constitutional Court (First Senate), 2 BVerfGE 12 (W. Ger.).
79. GG, sup.ra note 11, art. 1.
80. See Judgment of July 16, 1969 [1969], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 27
BVerfGE 1, 6 (W. Ger.); Judgment of Dec. 20, 1960 [1960], Federal Constitutional Court (First
Senate), 12 BVerfGE 53 (W. Ger.). For a discussion of the Federal Constitutional Court's
"human dignity" jurisprudence, see G. LEIBHOLZ & H. RINCK, GRUNDUFtSETZ FUER DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: KOMMENTAR AN HAND DES BUNDESVERFASSUGOSOERICHTS
55-57 (4th ed. 1971).
81. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975 [1975], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 39
BVerfGE 1, 67 (W. Ger.).
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the German idea of "human dignity" implies anything more than the
American constitutional ideas of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness;"82 the idea of fundamental justice occasionally found by the
Supreme Court to inhere in the notion of "due process; 83 or the
"human dignity" that Justice Brennan found in the meaning of the
eighth amendment.8 4 One finds no clear analytical definition of human
dignity in the Federal Constitutional Court's jurisprudence. Yet out of
that jurisprudence it is possible to cut a silhouette of man defined by his
responsibilities as well as his rights. The Federal Constitutional Court
envisions man as a rational being obligated to use his rights responsibly
and with due regard for the nature of the political system created by the
Basic Law. There is also a strong suggestion in the court's human dig-
nity jurisprudence, as well as in the text of the Basic Law, that funda-
mental rights are not only based on human dignity but are also to be
used to foster the growth of that dignity within the framework of the
political and moral order sanctioned by the constitution. It is in this
sense that the Basic Law may be said to create a "value-oriented"
sociopolitical and legal order.85
To understand the value orientation of the West German legal sys-
tem, it is helpful to realize that German constitutional jurisprudence
distinguishes between basic rights as subjective rights and basic rights
as objective value decisions of the constitutional order-a distinction
relevant to the judicial image of man just mentioned. Subjective rights,
often termed "defense" or "negative" rights, are claims that the indi-
vidual has against the state. Under article 1, section 3, these rights
"shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly
enforceable law."86 In short, these rights define a sphere of personal
freedom that government may not invade.
82. UNITED STATES DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (1776).
83. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 n.1 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
84. Id at 270 passim (Brennan, J., concurring).
85. In addition to freedom of speech (art. 5), the fundamental rights of the Basic Law in-
clude the right to life and inviolability of person (art. 2, § 2); the right to the free development of
personality (art. 2, § 1); freedom of religion (art. 4), assembly (art. 8), association (art. 9), privacy
(arts. 10 and 13), and movement (art. 11); the right to property (art. 14); and the right to equality
under law (art. 3). The German people acknowledge through article 1, § 2 that these fundamental
liberties are "inviolable and inalienable human rights [and form the] basis of every human com-
munity, of peace and of justice in the world." The primacy of these rights in the constitutional
order of the Federal Republic is underscored by article 19, § 2, which states that "in no case may
the essential content of a basic right be encroached upon." In addition, the values of article 1 have
been established in perpetuity, for under the terms of article 79, article 1-just as article 20 (defin-
ing the Federal Republic as a "democratic and social federal state")-is beyond the amendatory
power of Parliament.
86. GG, supra note 11, art. 1, § 3.
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The German Constitution does not, however, imply a state indif-
ferent to the social context in which basic rights are exercised or to
threats to basic freedoms originating in nonofficial sources. Basic rights
as objective value decisions are viewed as charging the state, in the
words of the President of the Federal Constitutional Court, "with an
affirmative duty to implement programs to secure and protect these val-
ues." ' They seem to oblige the state actively to create and safeguard a
sociopolitical context that will be conducive to the vigorous exercise of
subjective rights. The exercise of these subjective rights is in turn the
principal means for realizing the values of the political system.88
While the state must provide a system in which subjective rights
can be exercised, those rights must be exercised in conformity with cer-
tain principles of political obligation and ethical norms. Numerous ex-
amples of limitations on the exercise of fundamental freedoms, most
notably speech, can be found in the text of the Basic Law. The per-
sonal honor clause of article 5 limiting expression has already been
cited.8 9 Freedom of "[a]rt and science, research and teaching" is also
guaranteed, but "[f]reedom of teaching shall not absolve [the teacher]
from loyalty to the Constitution."90 Every person enjoys "the right to
the free development of his personality, [but only] insofar as he does
not . . . offend against the constitutional order or the moral code." '
Germans "have the right to form associations and societies," but
"[a]ssociations, the purposes or activities of which conflict with crimi-
nal laws or which are directed against the constitutional order or the
concept of international understanding are prohibited. ' 92 Article 3,
section 3, states that no person shall be "prejudiced or favoured be-
cause of his. . . political opinions, '9 3 but article 33, dealing with the
civil service, declares that the administration of the state is to be en-
trusted to civil servants "whose . . . loyalty [is] governed by public
87. Benda, New Tendencies in the Development of Fundamental Rights in the Federal Republic
of Germany, 11 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 1, 6 (1977).
88. The "objective value" interpretation of basic rights has been developed in the Abortion
Case, Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 39 BVerfGE I (W.
Ger.), and in the Numerus Clausus Case, Judgment of July 18, 1972, Federal Constitutional Court
(First Senate), 33 BVerfGE 303 (W. Ger.). For a fuller discussion of the distinction between
subjective and objective rights, see K. HESSE, GRUNDZUEGE DES VERFASSUNOSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, 121-24 (5th ed. 1972).
89. GG, supra note 11, art. 5, § 2; see text accompanying note 76 supra.
90, GG, supra note 11, art. 5, § 3.
91. Id art. 2, § l.
92. Id art. 9, § 2.
93. Id art. 3, § 3.
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law. , 94
In addition, article 21 declares that "political parties shall partici-
pate in the forming of the political will of the people" and that "[tihey
may be freely established," but "parties which, by reason of their aims
or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free
democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Re-
public of Germany shall be unconstitutional." 95 Article 10 declares
that the "privacy of posts and telecommunications shall be inviolable,"
but persons affected by legal restrictions on this right "shall not be in-
formed of any such restriction if it serves to protect the free democratic
basic order or the existence or security of the Federation or a Land."96
Finally, article 18, potentially the most dangerous threat to freedom of
speech, provides that whoever abuses freedom of expression (particu-
larly of the press), assembly, association, privacy of posts and telecom-
munications, property, or asylum "in order to combat the free
democratic basic order, shall forfeit these basic rights."97 In short, the
limits on the exercise of fundamental rights are captured by such
constitutional concepts as "personal honor," "loyalty," "constitutional
order," "moral code," "international understanding," and "free demo-
cratic basic order."
The Basic Law accordingly reflects a conscious ordering of indi-
vidual freedoms and public interests. It resounds with the language of
human freedom, but a freedom restrained by certain political values,
community norms, and ethical principles. Its image of man is of a per-
son rooted in and defined by a certain kind of human community. Yet
in the German constitutionalist view the person is also a transcendant
being far more important than any collectivity. Thus, there is a sense
in which the Basic Law is both contractarian and communitarian in its
foundation: contractarian in that the Constitution carves out an area of
human freedom that neither government, private groups, nor individu-
als may touch; communitarian in the sense that every German citizen is
under obligation to abide, at least in his overt behavior, by the values
and principles of the moral and political order.
2. Speech and Security: The Committed Polity
The jurisprudence of speech in Germany seems clearly influenced by
94. Id art. 33, § 4.
95. Id art. 21.
96. Id art. 10.
97. Id art. 18.
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the Federal Constitutional Court's image of the political system. That
image is not fully portrayed in any one decision, but it clearly emerges
from a number of constitutional cases. Article 20, as noted above, de-
scribes the Federal Republic as "a democratic and social federal
state."98 This decision in favor of democracy, wrote the court in an
early decision, requires the "self-determination of the people." 99 Self-
determination requires, above all, the formation and maturation of
public opinion. This process begins in the social sphere where individ-
uals, private groups, and the press operate-which is completely in-
dependent of the state; it continues with political parties giving shape to
the collective will of the people; and it ends with the state's duty to
translate that will into public policy and, by doing so, to clarify and
deepen the common life of the community. As seen through the eyes of
the Federal Constitutional Court, the political system is composed not
of autonomous voters but of active and informed citizens involved in
public affairs, striving for the creation of a socially cohesive and politi-
cally integrated "free democratic basic order."
In German constitutional theory there is a close relationship be-
tween the main free speech clause of article 5,100 the freedom of associ-
ation provisions of article 9,101 and the provisions on political parties in
article 21.102 The dominant teaching with respect to article 5 is that
freedom of expression is fundamentally an individual right. In this
sense speech is a means of self-discovery and a necessary condition for
personal truthseeking. But the social and political significance of
speech is also heavily accented in the court's jurisprudence. Speech is a
means of breathing life into democracy, where public opinion plays a
critical role. But when the Court speaks of public opinion it is con-
98. Id art. 20.
99. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1951 [1951], Federal Constitutional Court, I BVerfGE 14 (W.
Ger.).
100. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
101. Article 9 reads in part: "(1) All Germans shall have the right to form associations and
societies. (2) Associations, the purposes or activities of which conflict with criminal laws or which
are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding, are
prohibited."
102. Article 21 reads:
(1) The political parties shall participate in the forming of the political will of the people.
They may be freely established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic
principles. They must publicly account for the sources of their funds.
(2) Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to
impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the
Federal Republic of Germany, shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional
Court shall decide on the question of unconstitutionality.
(3) Details shall be regulated by federal laws.
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cerned as much with defending a given context of communicative ac-
tion as it is with defending the freedom of utterance itself.
The formation of public opinion, in the mind of the court, is a two-
step process. Thepreliminary formation of public opinion is mainly the
right and responsibility of individuals, associations, and the press. In
their capacity as shapers of opinion, they are constituent elements of
the political system and essential to the operation of democracy. Con-
sequently, the state may not interfere with their essential tasks. But the
conflicting and disparate opinions of individuals, private groups, and
the media somehow need to be integrated into unified political pro-
grams if the state is to function reasonably and democratically. Here,
political parties enter to complete the process of translating opinion
into state policy. Article 21 authorizes political parties to "participate
in forming the political will of the people"' 3 and in this capacity, par-
ticularly during election campaigns, they assume the character of "con-
stitutional organs" of the state. To this extent, article 21, in the court's
view, has transformed the German political system into what the court
has designated a "party state" (Parleienstaat), fully legitimating politi-
cal opposition in the form of a multi-party system.)°
The social function of speech can clearly be inferred from the lan-
guage of article 5. Recall that it guarantees the right freely to express
and disseminate "opinion" and to be informed "from generally accessi-
ble sources" among which "reporting" by the press is paramount. The
court's jurisprudence underscores the "public functions" of the press,
the most important of which are to clarify public opinion, to take posi-
tions on policy issues, and to guide public debate. The court consid-
ered the press' public role in great detail in the well-known Spiegel
Seizure1°5 case. Again we hear the language of subjective and objec-
tive rights. The court noted that the Basic Law confers a subjective
right on persons and publishers to be free of all official restraints; on
the objective side, the "free press" is a favored institution in the society
and thus the state is obligated affirmatively to safeguard the press, inter
alia, by ensuring access to the profession of journalism, by protecting
private sources of information, and perhaps even by taking action
103. GG, supra note 11, art. 21.
104. For a discussion of the court's political party jurisprudence, see Kommers, Politics and
Jurisprudence in West Germany: State Financing of Political Parties, 16 AM. J. JuRis. 215-41
(1971).
105. Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966 [1966], Federal Constitutional Court, 20 BVerfGE 162 (W.
Ger.).
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"against the development of monopolies of opinion."'' 1 6 Needless to
say, the societies and associations whose freedom of organization is
guaranteed under article 9 are also fully protected by the speech provi-
sions of article 5.
The "free democratic basic order," of which the freedom of speech
is such an essential element is the liberal democracy consciously cre-
ated, promoted, and protected by express provisions of the Basic
Law. 107 That order was defined in the first constitutional case declaring
a political party unconstitutional, in part because of its advocacy of
Nazi ideas. The Federal Constitutional Court wrote:
[T]he free democratic basic order can be defined as an order which
excludes any form of tyranny or arbitrariness and represents a gov-
ernmental system under a rule of law, based upon self-determination
of the people as expressed by the will of the existing majority and
upon freedom and equality. The fundamental principles of this or-
der include at least: respect for the human rights given concrete form
in the Basic Law, in particular for the right of a person to life and
free development; popular sovereignty; separation of powers; respon-
sibility of government; lawfulness of administration; independence of
the judiciary; the multi-party principle; and equality of opportunities
for all political parties.'
The Federal Constitutional Court has suggested that these principles
are so intrinsic to the Basic Law that the court would invalidate even a
constitutional amendment compromising or abrogating one of these
principles. 09 According to the court's interpretation, the constituent
assembly clearly opted for a "militant democracy" that would aggres-
sively defend the constitutional order of which these principles are an
inherent part. In the eyes of the court, the state has the right, if not the
duty, to defend itself by surpressing anticonstitutional activities. The
state is not helpless and need not constitutionally observe a stoical si-
lence even in the face of verbal assaults on its constitutional structure.
Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court has sanctioned a preemptive
106. Id at 175-76.
107. The term "free democratic basic order" appears in no fewer than six different sections of
the Basic Law. See GG, supra note 11, arts. 10(2), 11(2), 18, 21, 87a, 91. The term "constitutional
order," the meaning of which absorbs the notion of liberal democracy, appears in seven different
sections. See id art. 2(1), 9(2), 20(3), 20(4), 98(2), 28(1), 28(3).
108. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1952, [1952] Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 2
BVerfGE 1, 12-13 (W. Ger.). The translation is from W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, COMPARA-
TIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 603 (1977).
109. See Judgment of Dec. 18, 1953 [1953], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 3
BVerfGE 225 (W. Ger.).
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democracy, the quintessential mark of which is that there shall be no
freedom for the enemies of freedom.
In accordance with this spirit, the German Criminal Code includes
comprehensive definitions of treason, betrayal, and other forms of an-
ticonstitutional activity that in the United States would raise serious
questions under the first amendment.I" The most recent of these stat-
utes is the Anticonstitutional Advocacy Act of 1976, which added sec-
tion 88a to the internal security provisions of the code. Under this
section, any person involved in the production, distribution, or public
display of written material advocating or supporting criminal acts con-
travening the Basic Law or endangering the stability and security of the
state may be punished with up to three years of imprisonment."'
Even if these statutes constitute "general laws" which can limit
freedom of speech under the provisions of article 5, constitutional re-
view is not at a close. Serious issues of free speech and press more
often arise out of the manner in which such statutes are applied and
enforced. It is customary for the court to ask whether the activities or
decisions of enforcement officials reflect the fundamental values of the
constitutional order and whether these officials have accorded proper
weight to the value of free speech in their decisions. Any law, regula-
tion, procedural ruling, or other action of government officials imping-
ing on speech is also bound by the constitutional principles of
Rechtsstaalichkeit (rule of law) and Verhaeltnismaessigkeit (propor-
tionality): The first requires clarity, precision, and generality in the ar-
ticulation of all legal rules; the second requires a rational nexus
between ends and means.
The Civil Servant Loyalty"2 case of 1975 illustrates the application
of these principles of review as well as the role of the general substan-
tive norms that have been discussed. Article 33(4), which recognizes
the traditional and historic role of civil servants in the German political
system, declares that "the exercise of state authority as a permanent
function shall as a rule be entrusted to members of the public service
whose status, service, and loyalty are governed by public law."' "3 But
article 33(2) also provides that "[e]very German shall be equally eligi-
ble for any public office according to his aptitude, qualifications, and
110. See Law of Jan. 2, 1975, [1975] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I (W. Ger.) §§ 80-104a.
111. Id. § 88a. The statute was partially a parliamentay reaction to the outbreak of terrorist
violence in West Germany.
112. Judgment of May 22, 1975 [1975], Federal Constitutional Court (Second Senate), 39
BVerfGE 334 (W. Ger.).
113. GG, supra note 11, art. 33, § 4.
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professional achievements."' "14 The Federal Civil Service Act," 5 en-
acted pursuant to these provisions, seeks to ensure the loyalty of federal
public servants by requiring, as a condition of their entry into the state
bureaucracy, that they "defend at all times the free democratic basic
order within the spirit of the Basic Law."' 1 6 Federal guidelines for the
organization of the civil service at the state level contain an identical
provision." 17
In January, 1972, against the backdrop of student demonstrations
and political violence in the Federal Republic, the federal and state
governments issued a decree incorporating additional guidelines for
determining the loyalty of applicants for public service. Participation
in anticonstitutional activities and membership in an organization pur-
suing anticonstitutional goals were regarded as sufficient reasons for
doubting the loyalty of a public service applicant.I " The constitutional
case arose as a result of Lower Saxony's refusal to permit a law school
graduate to embark upon his in-service training at the state level be-
cause of his statements and activities as a member of an anticonstitu-
tional group while a student at Kiel University.
The Federal Constitutional Court was faced with the necessity of
performing several "balancing acts" in this case. For example, the
court had to balance article 33 with the basic right of all Germans
"freely to choose their trade, occupation, or profession, under article
12. Furthermore, the court had to balance the loyalty clause of article
33 with not only the equality principle of article 3, which states that "no
person may be prejudiced or favored because of his. . . political opin-
ions," but also with the express rights to speech and association, all of
which are basic rights the essential content of which may not be en-
croached upon according to article 19. Finally, a balance had to be
struck between a broad construction of the loyalty clause and the in-
ferred right of persons to join parties (Parteienprivileg) under article 21.
Other interpretive questions not directly addressed by the Federal
Constitutional Court are equally compelling. For example, does "loy-
alty" fall within any reasonable definition of the "aptitude" constitu-
tionally required of public servants? In light of the paramount value of
speech and association, is the principle of proportionality offended by a
114. Id §2.
115. BBG § 7(1)2.
116. Id
117. BRRG § 4(1)2.
118. For the text of the decree, see P. FRISCH, EXTREMISTEN BESCHLUSS 142 (1976).
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rule that would exclude a person from the public service solely by rea-
son of past membership in an anticonstitutional organization? Is the
principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit offended by a rule effectively prohibit-
ing membership in an organization not formally declared unconstitu-
tional by the court?
In its decision, the court adjusted these interests in such a way as to
uphold the decree but to limit its application. Noting that the com-
ments or actions of a young person during his student days, particularly
after the lapse of time, do not warrant an inference of disloyalty, the
court severely limited the discretion of state hiring authorities. The
court stated that an adequate weighing of the values involved required
that a finding of disloyalty be based upon ascertainable facts, and that
certain procedural guarantees be observed. 119
With regard to the "membership" provision of the decree, the
court was divided in its interpretation of the balance between articles
33 and 21. The majority view is less congenial to the rights of speech
and association. This view holds that the sanctions of the two articles
are not directed at the same conduct, activity, or behavior. Active and
militant opposition to liberal democracy is required to trigger a prohi-
bition of a party under article 21, whereas article 33 requires action and
militant support of the constitutional order. Thus, a political party
could be permissible under article 21, but the members of that party
could still be ineligible for civil service under article 33. On this rea-
soning, the purpose of article 33 requiring active support would be de-
feated if exclusion from the public service were only to be conditioned
on membership in a formally declared unconstitutional party.12
The minority held that article 21 limits the scope of article 33,
which requires "the public service [to be] regulated with due regard to
the traditional principles of the professional civil service." Although
loyalty to the state was a paramount value under traditional principles
of public service, the Basic Law, unlike the constitutions of the Monar-
chy and Weimar, confers constitutional status on political parties, thus
elevating the Parteienstaat to a core principle of the Basic Law. This
principle, especially when considered in light of the Basic Law's free
119. Judgment of May 22, 1975 [1975], Federal Constitutional Court (Second Senate), 39
BVerfGE 334 (W. Ger.). These guarantees include: (1) adequate notice to the applicant of the
evidence or information against him; (2) the opportunity to rebut such information orally or in
writing and to present countervailing information; (3) the right of the applicant to be represented
by counsel; (4) a statement of reasons for an applicant's rejection; and (5) the right to have the
rejection reviewed by an administrative court.
120. Id at 357-60.
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speech and opinion clauses, incorporates a generous view of political
expression and justifies a narrow construction of article 33. Thus, the
minority concluded that only membership in a political party declared
unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court would warrant
exclusion from public service.'
21
In conclusion, it should be noted that the unconstitutional party
clause of article 21 is clearly in a state of tension with article 5. In 1956,
in its longest opinion to date, the court declared the Communist Party
of Germany (KPD) unconstitutional. 22 The court undertook its own
examination of the KPD, independent of any possible criminality that
might be found in the Criminal Code. After reviewing the history and
goals of the KPD, analyzing Marxism-Leninism as practiced today,
and scrutinizing the statements and writings of party leaders, the court
concluded that the KPD rejected the highest values of the constitu-
tional order. But that fact alone was not enough to warrant the party's
dissolution; the party in question must also have taken a "fighting and
aggressive" attitude toward the constitutional order and manifested an
"intent" to overthrow and eliminate that order. 23 Over the KPD ob-
jection that only "immediate action" could validly be suppressed, the
court held that the "intent" standard was met. By applying this stan-
dard, the court was not required to determine whether the state was, as
a result of the party's activities, in proximate danger of being sub-
verted.
The Communist Party of Germany case, like the Civil Servant case,
raises the serious question of how far the state may go in gathering and
publishing information about the activities of parties or groups that
have not been declared unconstitutional. This was also the issue in a
1975 case involving the National Democratic Party of Germany
(NPD).124 The NPD, an extreme rightist party, challenged the publica-
tion of an official report of the Federal Ministry of the Interior that
described the NPD as a "party engaged in anticonstitutional goals and
activity," as "radical right and an enemy of freedom," and as "a danger
to the free democratic basic order." A unanimous senate ruled that
state agencies concerned with the protection of the Basic Law were con-
stitutionally permitted, if not required, to make such findings, even
121. Id at 375-91.
122. Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956 [1956], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 5
BVerfGE 85 (W. Ger.).
123. Id at 141-47.
124. Judgment of Oct. 29, 1975 [1975], Federal Constitutional Court (Second Senate), 40
BVerfGE 287 (W. Ger.).
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without any formal declaration of the unconstitutionality of the politi-
cal party under investigation. 25
3. Speech and Reputation: A Polity of Responsible Persons
As asserted earlier, German constitutional theory regards free speech as
inherent in the concept of "human dignity" and absolutely necessary to
the fulfillment of each person's article 2 right "to the free development
of his personality." 126 In Germany, as in the United States, speech is
primarily an individual (subjective) right with which, as a general rule,
the state may not interfere. The article 5 proviso limiting speech by
"the provisions of the general laws, provisions of laws for the protec-
tion of youth, and by the right to inviolability of personal honor"'
127
does not give the legislature a roving commission to decide which pub-
lic interests or social values are to be protected at the expense of free
speech. The Basic Law has already made those choices. General laws
must protect what the Basic Law purports to protect. Therefore, even if
such laws meet the standard of "general" within the meaning of article
5, they will ordinarily trigger careful judicial scrutiny before the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court. While such laws are not constitutionally sus-
pect to the degree they are in the United States,, the court is
nevertheless required to determine whether in passing such laws the
legislature has responded adequately to its duty under article 5, section
3, to enforce the objective rights or value decisions of the Basic Law,
one of the most important of which is the freedom of speech and
press. 128
The German civil and penal codes include numerous provisions
that incorporate the social ethics that inhere in the concept of "moral
'order" within the meaning of the Basic Law. For example, the Federal
Criminal Code punishes speech or writings that revile religious institu-
tions and their rites, advocate racial hatred and genocide, ridicule the
state and its symbols, disparage constitutional organs, defame political
personalities, mock the memory of the dead, or insult the Federal Presi-
125. Id See also Judgment of Jan. 17, 1978 [19781, Federal Constitutional Court (Second
Senate), 47 BVerfGE 130 (W. Ger.).
126. See Judgment of Jan. 25, 1961 [1961], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 12
BVeffGE 113, 125 (W. Ger.); Judgment of Jan. 15, 1958 [1958], Federal Constitutional Court
(First Senate), 7 BVerfGE 198, 208 (W. Ger.).
127. GG, supra note 11, art. 5 § 1.
128. For a general discussion of constitutional interpretation in the area of speech, see
Glaeser, Die Meinungs/reiheit in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesve /assungsgerchts, 97 ARCHIV DES
OEFFENTLICHEN R cHTs 276-98 (1972).
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dent. 129 While statements that might otherwise be regarded as mali-
cious gossip are privileged if they are an appropriate means of
protecting valid public or private interests, the person uttering such
statements is nevertheless obligated by law to consider the legitimate
interests of the person he "maligns," as well as the circumstances in
which he makes such utterances. 130
The remedies available to victims of defamatory statements and
the sanctions applied to the maker of those statements illustrate the
interrelationship between speech and the German view of the "basic
order." For example, defamatory remarks about politicians are pun-
ished with greater severity than slanderous statements about private
persons. "Defamatory" and "calumnious" remarks about persons "ac-
tive in the political life of the nation" are punishable by up to five years
of imprisonment if the statements are "directed at the public status of
that person and tend greatly to hamper the exercise of his public func-
tions." '31 As to remedies, the German Civil Code (Buergerliches
Gesetzbuch) authorizes compensatory damages for the victims of slan-
der.' 32 Among the other civil remedies available to such victims is the
publication by the defendant of the judicial ruling against him. A re-
lated provision of the civil code, which figures prominently in the Luth
case 3 3 discussed below, forbids behavior that offends "good morals" or
the "moral conscience of the German people."'
' 34
Although they appear facially consistent with the fundamental
value choices of the Basic Law, these statutes actually pose potential
threats to freedom of speech and press. Because the general lack of any
judicial challenge to these statutes in concrete judicial review proceed-
ings before the Federal Constitutional Court, constitutional problems
involving claims to freedom of speech and press are more likely to arise
out of constitutional complaints brought against judicial rulings pursu-
ant to these and other general laws.' 35 The three constitutional deci-
sions involving such complaints which best illustrate the court's
129. See Federal Criminal Code, Law of Jan. 2, 1975, STGB arts. 166, 131, 902, 90b, 187a,
189, 90.
130. Id art. 193.
131. Id art. 187. The law of slander distinguishes between "insult" (Beleidigung), "defama-
tion" (ueble Nachrede), and "calumny" (Verleumdung). See id art. 185-187.
132. BORrERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] art. 823-826 (W. Ger.).
133. Judgment of Jan. 5, 1958, f1958] Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 7 BVerfGE
198 (W. Ger.).
134. BORGERLICHES GEsEa'ZBUCl [BGB] art. 826 (W. Ger.).
135. For an explanation of the difference between the various forms of constitutional review,
see text accompanying notes 11-27 supra.
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approach to conflicts between speech and reputation are Luth,136 Me-
phisto,"37 and Lebach.13s
In Luth, Hamburg's director of public relations (Luth) called upon
film distributors and theater owners to boycott "Immortal Lover," a
movie produced by Veit Harlan, a film director who had produced no-
toriously anti-semitic movies under the Nazi regime. The company
that produced the film procured an injunction against the proposed
boycott, a ruling upheld by Hamburg's High Court of Appeals. The
lower court ruled that Luth's call for a boycott, with its harsh attack on
Harlan for his conduct during the Nazi era, was behavior contrary to
"good morals" within the meaning of article 826 of the Civil Code.139
Luth filed a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional
Court claiming that the injunction violated his right to free speech as
guaranteed by article 5.
Luth, which overturned the injunction, represents a seminal case
in free speech analysis. The case did not involve a direct encroachment
by government on a fundamental right; rather, it was a civil dispute
between private parties decided under the "good morals" clause of arti-
cle 826. The Federal Constitutional Court had no problem with the
validity of article 826, which it regarded as a valid "general law." The
court's approach to the case was rather "to judge the 'radiating effect'
of the basic rights on the civil law" and to determine whether the ordi-
nary judge, in construing the civil law, had attached proper weight to
the values of the Basic Law."4 With regard to the interrelationship
between the basic rights and the general laws the court stated:
[That relationship] must ... not be considered as a unilateral re-
striction on the effectiveness of the basic right by "general laws";
there rather exists reciprocal action in the sense that "general laws"
set bounds to the basic right; but, in turn, those laws must be inter-
preted in light of the value-establishing significance of this basic right
in a free democratic state, and so any limiting effect on the basic right
must itself be restricted.1
4 1
136. Judgment of Jan. 15, 1958 [1958], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 7
BVerfGE 198 (W. Ger.).
137. Judgment of Feb. 24, 1971 [1971], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 30
BVerfGE 173 (,V. Ger.). Several quotations from the Luth and Mephisto cases are from W. MUR-
PHY & J. TANENHAUS, supra note 108, at 528-32, 538-46.
138. Judgment of June 5, 1973 11973], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 35
BVerfGE 202 (W. Ger.).
139. BORGERLiCHES GFSETZBUCH [BGB] art. 826 (W. Ger.).
140. 7 BVerfGE at 207.
141. Id at 208-09.
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Thus, even in the area of private relationships, the ordinary judge ap-
plying the general law is obligated to keep one eye focused on the basic
rights. Once again the court reaffirmed the doctrine that the "dignity of
the human personality" is at the core of the Basic Law's value system,
"the most immediate expression [of which] is the basic right of free
expression. . . as a constituent element of a free democratic order."1
42
The Luth case rested on a very careful analysis of the circum-
stances in which the challenged utterances were made. An interesting
aspect of the case is the court's equally careful attention to the nature of
Luth's utterances and to his motivation for calling for the boycott. The
court noted, inter alia, that Luth's utterances were not motivated by
economic interests or political opportunism; that he intended by his
statements to influence the cultural life of the German people, an issue
of extreme public importance in the light of the recent past; that as a
person active in restoring German-Jewish relationships he was legiti-
mately concerned with the impact on the public mind of Harlan's reap-
pearance in the German film industry; that his statements were fair and
substantially correct; and that Harlan, in the circumstances of this case,
would not suffer irreparable injury as a filmmaker. The court's essen-
tial holding was that freedom of expression must prevail over reputa-
tional interests in this case because the speaker wanted "primarily to
help form public opinion" and "to contribute to the intellectual battle
of opinions on an issue substantially affecting the public."
43
In a related case,'" decided in 1969, the court strongly suggested
that speech loses its character as "opinion" within the meaning of arti-
cle 5 if it is designed to coerce public or private behavior rather than
merely shape public opinion. In that case, the powerful Axel Springer
newspaper house threatened to stop delivering its papers to news-
dealers who sold a leftwing magazine advertising radio and television
programs from East Germany. The magazine lost its case in lower
courts on the ground that a judgment awarding civil damages would
violate Springer's right to free speech. The Federal Constitutional
Court reversed, holding that free speech does not include the spreading
of one's views by means of such economic pressure.145 Speech accom-
panied by such pressure, the court seemed to say, is beyond the realm
of rational discourse and therefore outside the Basic Law's image of
142. Id at 208.
143. Id at 212.
144. Judgment of Feb. 26, 1969 [1969], Federal Constitutional Court (First Senate), 25
BVerfGE 256 (W. Ger.).
145. Id
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man as an autonomous person who develops freely within the social
community.
46
The second leading case on the relationship between speech and
reputation involved the publication of a new edition of Klaus Mann's
Mephisto,"47 a novel about a German actor who had attained fame and
fortune during the Nazi period. Mann based his story on the life of a
well-known Faustian actor, Gustaf Gruendgens, whom Hitler had be-
friended. The fictional character, wholly immoral and corrupt, was ad-
mittedly a pale image of the real actor who had died in 1963. In 1968,
Gruendgen's adopted son secured a judicial ban on the book, the lower
courts taking the view that it defamed the memory of his stepfather
notwithstanding Mann's insistence that he had no particular person in
mind when he wrote the book. In a 6-2 decision, 4 ' the First Senate
upheld the ban, holding that Gruendgen's right to personal honor as
guaranteed by article 2 of the Basic Law had been infringed.
The Federal Constitutional Court's analysis of this case begins
with a clear recognition of the right to artistic expression which, under
the terms of article 5, section 3, is not even subject to direct limitation
by the general laws. Any limitation on artistic liberty, noted the court,
must be found in the Basic Law itself, notably in the dignity of man
clause of article 1, "which as the supreme value, governs the entire
value system of the Basic Law.""'49 The court observed that a conflict
between the constitutional values of artistic freedom and personal dig-
nity may arise whenever a writer, "using personal data about people in
his environment," affects the "social rights [of others] to respect and
esteem." 5o Thus, two rights of relatively equal value-artistic freedom
and reputation-need to be balanced against one another. Such a bal-
ance requires careful judicial examination of the relevant literary prod-
uct in order to determine the relationship between the "image" of the
fictional figure and the "original." "If such a study," remarked the
court, "reveals that the artist has given or wanted to give a 'portrait' of
the 'original,' then the answer [to the conflict of rights problem] de-
pends on the extent of artistic abstraction or the extent and importance
146. See also Tobacco-Atheist Case, Judgment of Nov. 8, 1960, [1960] Federal Constitutional
Court (First Senate), 12 BVerfGE I (W. Ger.) (freedom of religion had been abused and the
dignity of a prisoner invaded when a fellow prisoner sought by promises of certain material goods
to convert the former prisoner from Christianity to atheism).
147. The novel was recently published in English. K. MANN, Mephisto (1977).
148. 30 BVerfGE 173.
149. Id
150. Id at 193.
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of the 'falsification' of the reputation or memory of the person con-
cerned."' 51
The court declined to apply this test itself; instead, it merely deter-
mined whether the courts below had properly weighed the conflicting
rights of the parties and fully considered the value order established by
the Basic Law. The court found that the courts below had determined
that Gruendgen's sphere of personality had been invaded by the novel
and had concluded that although the obligation to protect the personal-
ity sphere diminishes as the memory of the deceased person fades, the
facts of the case warranted the protection of the human dignity clause.
According to the majority of the court such action by the lower courts
constituted a proper balance of the conflicting interests.
Powerful dissenting opinions argued, however, that the proper bal-
ancing had not been performed by the courts below because the judges
failed to consider adequately the aesthetic values of Meptisto as a work
of the imagination; instead, they had focused disproportionately on the
social effects of Mephisto as biography and history. The minority was
also of the view that the lower courts had overestimated the effects of
the novel on the reputation of Gruendgen, in part because his name
was by this time confined to the memory of a relatively small number
of people whose minds the book was unlikely to change.'
52
The Lebach case, which bears some resemblance to Time, Inc. v.
Hill'53 and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,'54 involved a television
documentary about several vicious murders committed in 1969 by three
men ideologically opposed to the existing society, whose subsequent
trial the press followed in lavish detail. The "documentary" took the
form of a drama reenacting the crime and delving into the psychologi-
cal makeup and motivations of the criminals, who were also known to
be homosexuals. One of the three criminals eligible for parole in 1973
151. Id at 195.
152. See id at 200-27 (Stein and Bruenneck, JJ., dissenting).
153. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Time involved the publication of an article by L fe Magazine about
a play based on the widely reported experience of a family held prisoner in their home outside
Philadelphia by three escaped convicts. But L/ e grossly exaggerated the family's "ordeal." The
Supreme Court ruled that freedom of the press bars the application of a privacy statute to redress
false reports on matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the report was published
with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard for the truth. Id at 391-98.
154. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). In Cox Broadcasting, the name of a rape victim was identified in a
television broadcast notwithstanding a state law barring the publication of the names of rape
victims. The Supreme Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments barred civil damages
for the invasion of privacy where the name of the rape victim was procured from official docu-
ments open to public inspection.
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sought an injunction to prevent the showing of the teleplay, which
identified him by name. He claimed that the film would hamper his
rehabilitation as a responsible member of the community in violation
of the personality development clause of article 2'"1 He also claimed
that while the teleplay was truthful in its essential details, its exaggera-
tions of his personal moral failings would undermine his dignity as a
person. The lower courts denied the injunction on the grounds that his
criminal behavior had cast him into the public forum. The Federal
Constitutional Court, however, granted a preliminary injunction
preventing the showing of the teleplay. The subsequent holding of oral
argument by the Federal Constitutional Court and the filing of briefs
by nearly every major media association in Germany underscored the
importance of the case.'
5 6
Lebach reasserted with special force the governing principles to be
applied in defamation cases. As in Mephisto, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court insisted upon a proper weighing of the values of freedom
of press and the right of an individual to his personality. The Court
declared:
The resolution of this conflict must proceed from the fact that
both constitutional values are essential components of the free demo-
cratic order and of equal value under the Basic Law. The Basic
Law's image of man and its corresponding conception of the political
community require the acknowledgment of the independence of the
individual personality as well as the existence of a climate of freedom
which today would be unthinkable without a process of free commu-
nication.
157
Ordinarily, the weighing process would favor freedom of press. But
here, said the court, the passage of time had eroded the newsworthy
character of the original crime, thus heightening the interest of the
complainant in his reputation and privacy. The court took note of the
complainant's desire and need for anonymity as well as society's inter-
est in his full reintegration into the community. According to the court,
the human dignity and personality clauses guarantee the right "to be let
alone,. . . embracing the [further] right to one's possession of his own
image and spoken words." 158 The court seemed impressed by the spe-
cial impact of television on the public mind, suggesting that perhaps a
printed account of the crime would have survived a test under article 5.
155. GG, supra note 11, art. 2, § I.
156. See 35 BVerfGE 213-14.
157. Id at 225.
158. Id at 220.
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An American scholar musing over Lebach will be struck not only
by its contrast to Time,'59 and Cox Broadcasting Co.,' 6 ' but also by
New York Times v. United States. 6 ' New York Times forbade any
prior restraint on publication of "state secrets" where the government
had not met the burden of showing justification for the imposition of
such a restraint. Lebach is a privacy case, whereas New York Times
deals with internal security. Yet the Lebach and New York Times cases
illustrate the different approaches of the two courts to prior restraint.
In the United States, any prior restraint on speech bears a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity; in Germany, prior restraint
on speech may be ordered in the light of the equally high value at-
tached to the personality and dignity clauses of the Basic Law. Actu-
ally, the nomenclature of "prior restraint" is not used in German
constitutional law)62 But is is clear from Lebach that censorship can
be imposed on speech that invades the "personality sphere" of the indi-
vidual.
CONCLUSION
The German and American cases discussed herein are marked by a
common core of doctrinal agreement. The constitutional law of both
countries regards the fundamental freedoms of speech and press as lib-
erties essential to personal development and political democracy. Both
countries regard the freedom of press (including radio and television)
as necessary to the formation and education of public opinion. Any
form of advocacy or argument having political, literary, social, artistic,
or scientific value is ardently defended by the constitutional tribunals
of both countries; the protection of such expression does not depend on
its popularity, utility, or quality. The freedoms of speech and press are
not in any sense absolute rights, however, for they are subject to the
general law of both countries. Yet a heavy burden of proof is required
to impose any valid restraint on speech. In both the United States and
Germany, only substantial security, privacy, or reputational interests
justify legal restraints on speech or press, and all such restrictions auto-
matically trigger careful judicial scrutiny of the circumstances involved
in any given case.
159. 385 U.S. 374 (1967); see note 153 supra.
160. 420 U.S. 469 (1975); see note 154 supra.
161. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
162. The Basic Law forbids only "censorship," which clearly protects all forms of political
speech and the expression of other public opinion. See GG, supra note 11, art. 5, § 1; note 76
supra.
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Nevertheless, notable differences appear in the doctrines and ap-
proaches of the two tribunals. For example, the critical line separating
permissible from impermissible political speech is drawn by the
Supreme Court between advocacy of ideas and advocacy inciting, and
likely to produce, imminent lawless action; for the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, that line is dictated not by the probability of imminent
lawless action, but by whether the content of speech presents a poten-
tially dangerous threat to the security of the "free democratic basic or-
der." The Supreme Court demands a legal posture of neutrality toward
all political ideas uttered in the public forum; the Federal Constitu-
tional Court envisions a polity capable of legally defending those fun-
damental political values and principles of the Basic Law. The
Supreme Court has protected false and erroneous statements about
public officials and public figures from application of civil and criminal
libel laws, provided such statements are not made with actual malicious
intent. The Federal Constitutional Court, however, requires a higher
standard of behavior and conduct on the part of both the press and
private citizens, insisting upon a responsible press and a disciplined cit-
izenry. In the Supreme Court's view, erroneous statements, no less
than abusive, irresponsible, or even useless speech, must be allowed if
the freedoms of expression are to have the "breathing space" they need
to survive. The Federal Constitutional Court applies a higher standard
of responsibility in determining whether "opinion" is constitutionally
protected speech; for example, "personal honor" and "human dignity"
are constitutional values found in the Basic Law itself and against
which free speech claims must be weighed. Finally, the Supreme Court
has held that the individual's interest in privacy fades when the infor-
mation involved already appears on the public record;163 the Federal
Constitutional Court, however, will not extend constitutional protec-
tion to the dissemination of such information if it is no longer relevant
to public affairs and impinges on the right of an individual to his per-
sonality and dignity. 64
Numerous historical reasons could be cited to explain these differ-
ences in constitutional doctrine. For example, the German notion of
"militant democracy" clearly emerges out of the memory of the Wei-
mar experience with constitutional government and Nazi totalitarian-
ism. The institutional, social, and ideological "determinants" of
163. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
164. Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202. It might be noted, however, that Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), give signs that the Supreme
Court may be turning in the direction of Lebach.
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American and German constitutional doctrine could also be explored,
but that would take us too far afield. Rather, this Article concludes,
even at the risk of exaggerating the different outlooks of the two tribu-
nals, by underscoring their competing visions of the role of free speech
in a constitutional democracy.
In the free speech jurisprudence of Germany and the United
States there is a considerable emphasis upon the autonomous individ-
ual and his freedomfrom authority. Yet the decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court reveal countervailing lines of thought that posit a
more amiable relationship between freedom and authority than found
in American speech cases. A residue of the classical German theory of
liberty, 165 this view holds that as the corporate representative of the
community and the ultimate protector of the community's basic values,
the state should provide moral leadership in the use of freedom. In the
German view, human dignity can exist only when persons are allowed
to develop themselves as rational beings in community with others.
The polity is the highest expression of community because, in the polit-
ical arena, persons are conscious of their citizenship, the grand purpose
of which is to act in concert with others for common ends. This essen-
tially Aristotelian idea of polity views politics as a means of realizing in
public life the highest values of the community. Thus, the political sys-
tem as seen through the eyes of the Federal Constitutional Court is
marked as indelibly by fraternity as by liberty and equality.
1 66
By contrast, the American judicial conception of the polity places
a heavier emphasis upon the individual. Politics is a means for the
achievement of private ends, a means of securing personal and group
goals. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court does not bristle with
the language of "community," "public good," and "moral order"; the
pluralism it envisions in democratic society is less integral than that
envisioned by the Federal Constitutional Court. In the American view,
the community has no valid claim upon the individual person, particu-
larly in the domain of mind and morals.167 In the German view, the
community does have some claim upon the mind and morals of the
165. See L. KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM 86-138 (1957).
166. These views were strongly advanced by Federal Constitutional Court Justice Wilhelm
Geiger in G. SHUSTER, FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY IN THE WEST 55-68 (1967). See also Kom-
mers, Authority and Freedon" Some Comparative Observations in MENSCHENWUERDE UND
FREIHEITLICHE RECHTSORDNUNG 357-76 (G. Leibholz ed. 1974); Benda, New Tendencies in the
Development ofFundamental 1Ights in the Federal Republic of Germany, I 1 J. MAR. J. PRAC. &
PROc. 1, 5-9 (1977).
167. For a recent criticism of this American view, see J. TussMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE
MIND (1977).
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individual to the extent that each person is constitutionally obligated to
support the norms of the Basic Law and abide by the moral code of the
community. While that individual possesses an inner core of dignity
that the community (or state) may not touch, he is not the morally au-
tonomous person of American constitutional law.
These competing images of the polity affect each tribunal's notion
of the role of speech. The American doctrine of free speech implies an
immense faith in the ability of the individual to discern the truth where
he sees it. Authority may not legally guide men toward truth; rather
the marketplace of ideas determines it. In American theory, "truths"
may not be incorporated into public law in such a way as to forbid any
person or group from attacking them verbally or changing them by po-
litical means. In Germany, however, speech is juridically valued for its
capacity to create community. The German view holds that free
speech requires the observance of certain traditions of civility; it re-
quires persons participating in the forum of public discussion to speak
the truth and to do so with respect for other persons' personal honor
and dignity. In short, the purpose of political discourse in German the-
ory is to create a tradition of civility and a polity of responsible citizens.
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